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NON-RESTORABLE COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL: A 






  In Kentucky, a defendant’s competence to stand trial may be called into 
question at any point after arraignment.2 If reasonable grounds exist for the court to 
believe that the defendant is not competent to stand trial, the proceedings are halted 
and a full determination of the defendant’s capacity must be made.3 The court must 
then appoint a psychologist or psychiatrist to assess the defendant’s competence and 
file a report with the court detailing his or her findings.4 Once the report is submitted, 
the court holds a hearing to determine if the defendant is competent to stand trial.5 If 
the court deems the defendant incompetent to stand trial (IST), such a defendant may 
not be “tried, convicted, or sentenced so long as the incompetency continues.”6 
Kentucky is not unique in this procedure—the federal judiciary, as well as a majority 
of states, use this same process to assess a defendant’s ability to stand trial.7 
Competency proceedings increase in complexity when courts are faced with 
the decision of how to treat, detain, and rehabilitate such IST defendants. In 
Kentucky, the appointed psychologist or psychiatrist is required to make a second 
finding: What is the likelihood of the defendant’s competence being restored in the 
foreseeable future?8 When a defendant is found to be incompetent, but competence 
is substantially likely to be restored in the foreseeable future, the court will generally 
commit the defendant to a forensic psychiatry facility for competency restoration 
treatment for a period of sixty days.9 At the end of those sixty days, if the defendant 
is found competent to stand trial, the proceedings against him will continue.10 
A defect appears in Kentucky’s criminal procedure, however, when a 
defendant is found incompetent and his competence is deemed unlikely to be restored 
in the foreseeable future. In this case, the court is required to conduct an involuntary 
hospitalization of the defendant pursuant to chapter 202A or 202B of the Kentucky 
Revised Statutes. 11  The proscribed chapters outline the criteria for involuntary 
 
1 J.D. Candidate, The University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law (2021); B.S. in 
Community Communications and Leadership Development, University of Kentucky. 
2 KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.06 (West 2020). 
3 Id. 
4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100(1) (West 2020). 
5 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100(3) (West 2020). 
6 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.090 (West 2019). 
7 See Jennifer Piel, Michael J. Finkle, Megan Giske, & Gregory B. Leong, Determining a Criminal 
Defendant’s Competency to Proceed With an Extradition Hearing, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 
201, 202 (2015). 
8 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100(2) (West 2020). 
9 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(1) (West 2020). 
10 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(3) (West 2020). 
11 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110(2) (West 2020). 
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hospitalization for a person with a mental illness12 or a person with an intellectual 
disability.13 One element of both criteria is that the patient can reasonably benefit 
from the treatment provided in the hospitalization.14 When a person is deemed to 
have non-restorable competence, however, there is, by definition, no possible 
treatment which could benefit their condition. Thus, once such a defendant is 
hospitalized involuntarily, the hospital must discharge him because he fails to meet 
the criteria for an admission under KRS 202A or 202B.15 Kentucky law provides 
little recourse for courts to prevent such defendants from being discharged.16  
This Note will examine the legal and historical framework that has led to 
this gap in criminal procedure in Kentucky and other states. Part I will outline the 
history of competence as a critical element of a criminal defense. Part II will 
distinguish the legal determination of competence from the clinical determination of 
capacity. Part III will address the due process and equal protection concerns 
associated with involuntary hospitalization or commitment for incompetency to 
stand trial. Part IV will explore Texas’s recent statutory scheme aimed at addressing 
the loophole in criminal procedure created by non-restorable competence. Part V will 
consider a pending criminal case against a Kentucky defendant who has been 
repeatedly classified as incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to regain competence. 
Part VI will examine proposed legislation and other measures to assure both due 
process to defendants and public safety to community-members. Lastly, Part VII will 
propose the simplest, least expensive criminal procedural reform in Kentucky’s 
history. 
I. THE HISTORY OF COMPETENCE 
 
As early as 1845, courts recognized the need for unique legal treatment of 
those designated criminally insane.17 In the Massachusetts case The Matter of Josiah 
Oakes, Judge Shaw found the “great law of humanity” to be sufficient legal basis for 
involuntary hospitalization of an insane person who presented a danger to himself or 
others.18  Further, Shaw found that the restraint could continue for an indefinite 
period of time—as long as the restraint was necessary to protect the defendant or 
others.19 Shaw’s theory of indefinite restraint and imprisonment of the criminally 
insane was popular among the states.20 By 1890, every state in the U.S. operated 
 
12 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2020). 
13 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (West 2020). 
14 Id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2020). 
15 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (West 2020). 
16 See generally Jason Riley & Chad Mills, Attorney Asks Judge to Dismiss Cane Madden’s Child Rape 
Case, WDRB.COM (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.wdrb.com/in-depth/attorney-asks-judge-to-dismiss-
cane-madden-s-child-rape/article_0d3d533c-f1da-11e9-8ef6-b7ec86cdb9bb.html 
[https://perma.cc/9SGY-NQAS] (describing the loophole in Kentucky’s involuntary hospitalization 
statutes). 
17 See generally Matters of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845) (holding that criminally insane 
defendants can be involuntary hospitalized if they are deemed a danger to themselves or others). 
18 Id. at 123. 
19 Id. 
20 See FREDERIC GARVER, THE SUBVENTION IN THE STATE FINANCES OF PENNSYLVANIA 229 (1919).  
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some form of “publicly-supported mental hospital,”21 the earliest being Virginia’s 
Eastern State Hospital, established in 1773.22  
The process by which a person was relegated to these facilities varied: a 
husband could have his wife committed, 23  a family member could recommend 
commitment, or a judicial decision could require commit.24 These early involuntary 
commitments were subject only to the requirement that the individual would benefit 
from treatment.25 As cases alleging wrongful commitment began to arise commonly 
in the late 1800s, institutions began identifying more formal criteria for admission.26 
States soon began to enact stricter methods for commitment,27 but in criminal cases, 
a finding that a defendant lacked the mental competence to stand trial often resulted 
in an indefinite, automatic commitment to an asylum or psychiatric treatment 
facility.28 
Beginning in 1960, a series of Supreme Court decisions began to create 
guidelines for the legal treatment of criminal defendants whose competence was in 
question. 29  In Dusky v. U.S., the Court held that a defendant's competence is 
determined by his “present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational and factual understanding 
of the proceedings against him.”30 The Court also distinguished mere orientation and 
recollection from legal competence to stand trial.31 In 1975, the Court further held 
that a defendant must also be able to assist in preparing his defense in order to be 
found competent to stand trial.32 
As courts adopted higher standards for involuntary and criminal 
commitments, Congress passed the Community Mental Health Act, moving funding 
out of state mental hospitals and into smaller treatment centers, intending to allow 
those housed in state mental hospitals to be treated quickly and released back into 
society. 33  In combination with the release of the first anti-psychotic drug, this 
 
21 Early Psychiatric Hospitals & Asylums, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/diseases/early.html [https://perma.cc/T54N-6KZE]. 
22 The History of Eastern State, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.esh.dbhds.virginia.gov/History.html 
[https://perma.cc/WJK8-AXX5]. 
23 MAUREEN DABBAGH, PARENTAL KIDNAPPING IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS 36 (2012).  
24 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE MENTAL 
HEALTH CARE CONTINUUM: HISTORICAL TRENDS AND PRINCIPLES FOR LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (2019), 





27 See id. (“Following a series of celebrated cases in the late 1800’s alleging wrongful commitment, 
procedures for commitment (but not legal criteria) were tightened.”). 
28 See Douglas R. Morris & Nathaniel J. DeYoung, Long-Term Competence Restoration, 42 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 81 (2014). 
29 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2020); 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2020); 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2020). 
30 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).  
31 Id. 
32 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). 
33 Michelle R. Smith, Kennedy’s Vision for Mental Health Never Realized, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 20, 
2013), https://apnews.com/4423a7a8da484b7fb0cb29dfdd1ddb96 [https://perma.cc/SWW5-G8WZ]. 
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legislation enabled many mentally ill patients to return to their homes.34 Those with 
the most severe mental conditions, however, were left without treatment options.35  
Between 1970 and 2014, the U.S. has experienced a 77% decline in total 
capacity for 24-hour psychiatric treatment.36 This decline can be attributed to the 
increase in outpatient treatment and the push for deinstitutionalization.37 Instead of 
returning home, many of these patients were “transinstitutionalized” into 
incarceration.38 Between four to seven percent of the growth in U.S. incarceration 
rates between 1980 and 2000 is attributable this lack of psychiatric care.39 To its 
shame, the three largest mental health treatment facilities in the U.S. are the Cook 
County Jail, Los Angeles County Jail, and Rikers Island.40  
 
II. COMPETENCE AND CAPACITY: LEGAL AND CLINICAL DIFFERENTIATION 
 
Kentucky’s problems in dealing with IST defendants begin with the 
designation of incompetence itself. In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court held that if a 
district court does not allow an inquiry into a defendant’s competence to stand trial, 
the court deprives the defendant of his “constitutional right to a fair trial.”41 The 
appointed expert, however, can only provide advisory information to the judge who 
makes the ultimate competency assessment.42  Kentucky statutory law provides little 
discussion of what constitutes competence to stand trial.43 Although the Supreme 
Court has provided instruction on the theoretical basis of competence, little guidance 
is given for situations in which a judge might disagree with the psychiatric 
appointee’s recommendation.  
When making a ruling on the defendant’s competence, the court is not 
limited to specific criteria to consider.44 Some federal courts have considered factors 
like inability to communicate intelligently,45 family history of mental health issues,46 
 
However, Kennedy is not all to blame. See Samantha Raphelson, How the Loss of U.S. Psychiatric 
Hospitals Led to a Mental Health Crisis, NPR (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:15AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/30/567477160/how-the-loss-of-u-s-psychiatric-hospitals-led-to-a-mental-
health-crisis [https://perma.cc/XC28-FUP5] (explaining that a provision in Medicaid prevents the 
program from covering long-term care in state institutions). 
34 Smith, supra note 33. 
35 Id. 
36 TED LUTTERMAN, ROBERT SHAW, WILLIAM FISHER & RONALD MANDERSCHEID, TREND IN 
PSYCHIATRIC INPATIENT CAPACITY, UNITED STATES AND EACH STATE, 1970 TO 2014 29 (2017). 
37 Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 Psychiatry 30, 33 (2010). 
38 Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the Deinstitutionalization of the 
Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 189, 219 (2013). 
39 Id. at 190. 
40 Smith, supra note 33. 
41 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). 
42 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100 (West 2020). 
43 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.090 (West 2020) (stating that incompetent defendants cannot stand 
trial but does not define what it means to be incompetent). 
44 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110 (West 2019) (listing the procedure for judicial determinations of 
incompetence) 
45 United States v. Nichelson, 550 F.2d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 1977). 
46 Id. 
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self-defeating behavior,47 hallucinations,48 prior use of antipsychotic medications,49 
and more. A mental disorder alone is not dispositive in showing incompetence.50 The 
judicial determination of competence revolves around one legal question—whether 
continuing with judicial proceedings affords the defendant a reasonable opportunity 
to participate in his defense.51  
When the court disagrees with the assessment performed by the appointed 
psychiatrist or psychologist, the court is at liberty to act against the expert’s 
recommendation.52 Because the current legal framework grants wide latitude and 
little concrete guidance on the specific criteria of a competency analysis, judges have 
become dependent upon appointed experts for diagnoses of defendants’ mental 
deficits.53 However, a study conducted on competence-to-stand-trial assessments in 
Hawaii found that judges are more likely to rule a defendant incompetent, rather than 
competent, after hearing conflicting expert testimony on competency.54  
The determination of the restorability of a defendant’s competence is even 
more convoluted. In some states, the court assesses the likelihood of restoration of a 
defendant’s competence within a statutorily specified timeframe; in other states, the 
court decides if restoration is likely in the foreseeable future.55 In Texas, restoration 
is predicated on guidance from the facility where the defendant was being treated. 56 
The greatest disparity between the legal and clinical distinctions occurs 
when an IST defendant whose competence is unlikely to be restored is relegated to 
involuntary commitment in a psychiatric treatment facility. In Kentucky, this issue 
manifests in the difference between the legal criteria for incompetence and the legal 
criteria for involuntary hospitalization.57 A defendant may be found incompetent by 
the courts, but his incompetence does not necessarily make him a candidate for 
involuntary hospitalization.58 Although the statutes allow an IST defendant to be 
committed into a psychiatric facility for hospitalization,59 they do not allow the 
facility to continue such a hospitalization once they deem the defendant to be 
 
47 Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000). 
48 Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 577 (11th Cir. 1990). 
49 Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 641 (11th Cir. 1991). 
50 Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1970). 
51 Barry W. Wall et. al., AAPL Practice Resource for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of 
Competence to Stand Trial, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRIC L. S1, S30 (2018). 
52 Randy K. Otto, Competency to Stand Trial, 2 APPLIED PSYCH. CRIM. JUST. 82, 84 (2006) 
(“Competence is ultimately a legal issue that is to be decided by the legal decision maker.”). 
53 David Collins, Re-Evaluating Competence to Stand Trial, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 176 (2019). 
54 W. Neil Gowensmith, Daniel C. Murrie & Marcus T. Boccaccini., Field Reliability of Competence to 
Stand Trial Opinions: How Often Do Evaluators Agree, and What Do Judges Decide When Evaluators 
Disagree?, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 130, 135 (2012). 
55 Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of 
Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 10 (1993). 
56 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.079 (West 2020). 
57 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100 (West 2020) (discussing the appointment of mental health 
experts to determine defendant competency), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (West 2020) 
(listing the criteria for a intellectually disabled defendant to be involuntarily committed), and KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2020) (listing the criteria for a mentally ill defendant to be involuntarily 
committed). 
58 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (West 2020). 
59 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110 (West 2020). 
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unlikely to benefit from treatment. 60  By creating the legal category of “non-
restorable competence,” the Kentucky legislature has created a class of criminal 
defendants whom they cannot legally jail, try, or commit. Any solution offered to 
this issue will require a standardization of language and a revision of the statutes to 
create a cohesive plan of both legal and psychiatric treatment for such IST defendants. 
 
III. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CONCERNS 
 
In Pate v. Robinson, the Supreme Court made a definitive ruling that to try 
or sentence a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial is a denial of due process 
of law.61 With substantive due process, a defendant has the right to not be prosecuted 
while incompetent.62 With procedural due process, a defendant has the right to a 
reasonable examination of his competency to stand trial.63 However, if a defendant’s 
competence is found unlikely to be restored, the application of due process to his 
circumstances becomes less clear.  
Nearly a decade after Pate, in Jackson v. Indiana, the Court addressed the 
issue of competence that is unlikely to be restored.64 Theon Jackson, a deaf-mute 
defendant accused of two thefts amounting to less than $10, was found incompetent 
to stand trial after a court-appointed psychiatrist testified that no state facilities were 
capable of developing Johnson’s communication abilities.65 Additionally, experts 
testified that even if Jackson were to gain “minimal communication skills,” he would 
still lack the mental capacity necessary to be found competent to stand trial.66 
Jackson was committed by the lower court until he could be deemed “sane.”67 On 
appeal, Jackson’s counsel argued that this commitment violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause68 and Due Process Clause.69 
Jackson’s claim that he was deprived of equal protection of the law stems 
from Indiana’s standards for commitment and release of criminal defendants in 
comparison to the commitment and release of individuals with mental illness who 
are undergoing civil commitment proceedings.70 The Court agreed with Jackson, 
finding that the State’s standard for commitment of criminal defendants was more 
lenient than the standard for commitment of mentally ill individuals under the civil 
commitment statute.71 Under both standards, commitment required examination by 
 
60 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2020) (defendant must “reasonably benefit” from treatment 
to be legally hospitalized involuntarily); accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (West 2020). 
61 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 561 F.3d 
22, 28 (1st Cir. 2009) (“A defendant’s due process right to a fair trial includes the right not to be tried, 
convicted or sentenced while incompetent.”). 
62 David W. Beaudreau, Due Process or "Some Process"? Restoring Pate v. Robinson's Guarantee of 
Adequate Competency Procedures, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 369, 370–71 (2001). 
63 Id. 
64 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
65 Id. at 717–19. 
66 Id. at 719. 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 723. 
71 Id. at 730. 
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two doctors, a judicial hearing with opportunity for cross-examination, opportunity 
to introduce evidence, and opportunity for appellate review.72 However, the standard 
for commitment of a criminal defendant only required the State to show that Jackson 
was incompetent to stand trial.73 Also, the State applied a more stringent standard for 
release for those committed as criminal defendants than those committed for mental 
illness.74 Under the civil commitment statute, a person committed for mental health 
reasons could be released as soon as the head of the commitment facility believed 
that their condition no longer justified commitment.75 A criminal defendant who had 
been committed, however, could only be released from his commitment after a 
“substantial change for the better in his condition.”76  
In Jackson’s case, the standard for release was especially stringent, 
considering experts had testified that he was likely unable to ever regain 
competence.77 The Court upheld Jackson’s equal protection challenge, finding that 
that the leniency in the standard for commitment of criminal defendants and the 
stringency of the standard for release of committed criminal defendants deprived 
Jackson of equal protection of the laws.78 
Further, Jackson contended that his right to due process of the law was 
violated by his indefinite commitment on the sole account of his incapacity to stand 
trial.79 By recognizing that Jackson’s competence was unlikely to be restored, but 
still committing him until he regained sanity, the district court’s commitment was a 
life sentence.80 The Court agreed with Jackson, holding that a criminal defendant 
may only be held a length of time reasonable to determine his competence and the 
likelihood of restoration of competence.81 If competence is deemed unlikely to be 
restored, the state must either drop the charges against the defendant or commit him 
under the state’s civil commitment procedures.82 If the defendant’s competence is 
deemed likely to be restored, his commitment must be beneficial in advancing his 
competence.83 Thus, if the defendant is not progressing or not able to progress toward 
competence, his remaining in state criminal custody is improper.84 
A more recent attack on modern competence restoration schemes turns on 
a defendant’s deprivation of protections afforded by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.85 In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court held that Title II of the ADA prohibits 
 
72 Id. at 727. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 728–29. 
75 Id. at 728. 
76 Id. at 729. 
77 Id. at 719. 
78 Id. at 730. 
79 Id. at 719. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 738. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. 
85 Alexandra Douglas, Caging the Incompetent: Why Jail-Based Competency Restoration Programs 
Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act Under Olmstead v. L.C., 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 525, 528 
(2019). 
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discrimination on the basis of disability86 and requires States to allow individuals 
with mental disabilities to be treated in community-based programs if a State 
treatment professional has deemed community placement appropriate, the transfer is 
unopposed by the individual, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated 
by the State.87  
In adopting jail-based competency restoration programs,88 several states 
have begun placing IST defendants in jail, regardless of the seriousness of their 
alleged crime or the danger they pose to themselves or others.89 Because many of 
these defendants would benefit from treatment in an integrated, community-based 
setting due to their mental disability, their assignment to jail-based competency 
restoration programs constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability.90 Broadly 
placing IST defendants into jail-based competency restoration programs neglects the 
ADA’s mandate for the least restrictive treatment setting necessary, and states that 
continue to disregard this requirement risk being found in violation of the ADA, 
regardless of intent.91 
 
IV. CASE STUDY: TEXAS 
 
In 2007, Advocacy, Inc., on behalf of a group of defendants deemed 
incompetent to stand trial, filed suit against the Texas Department of State Health 
Services, arguing that the defendants’ due process rights were violated by the State’s 
policy of holding IST defendants in jail, without treatment, until psychiatric 
treatment facility beds became available.92 Obtaining a bed in such a facility often 
took six months or longer. 93  After the aforementioned case was decided on 
jurisdictional grounds, a Texas state court considered the issue and ordered that IST 
defendants be given a bed within 21 days from the day he receives notice of his 
commitment. 94   
However, in 2014, the Texas Court of Appeals overturned this decision95 
and IST defendants were once again forced to remain in jail for months before 
placement in psychiatric treatment facilities.96 Texas lawmakers’ solution to this 
 
86 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2019). 
87 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999) 
88 See infra Part IV. 
89 See Douglas, supra note 85. 
90 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597. 
91 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1, 32 (2012). 
92 Lakey v. Taylor ex rel. Shearer, 278 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Brian Chasnoff & Melissa 
Fletcher Stoeltje, Texas 49th in Mental Health Funding, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Nov. 1, 2010), 
https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Texas-49th-in-mental-health-funding-
780070.php [https://perma.cc/29SW-UZRZ]. 
93 Lakey, 278 S.W.3d at 12. 
94  Lakey v. Taylor, 435 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014). 
95 Brian D. Shannon, Competency, Ethics, and Morality, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 861, 872 (2017). 




dilemma was the creation of jail-based competency restoration programs. 97  In 
response, Texas lawmakers began to consider an alternative option for competency 
restoration in IST defendants—jail-based competency restoration programs.98 
During the 2013 Texas legislative session, legislators passed a bill that 
utilized state funds to create jail-based competency restoration pilot programs,99 but 
the program was never implemented due to lack of personnel.100 Funding for the 
program was renewed in 2015, but implementation was further delayed by the “lack 
of a strong competitive pool” of bids for the contract for jail-based competency 
restoration services.101 In 2016, the Texas Judicial Council created a Mental Health 
Committee to explore the effectiveness and cost of various measures to determine 
the “best practices” of civil and criminal justice for those with mental illness, 
including IST defendants.102 The committee’s findings included a recommendation 
that current state law be changed to allow for alternative competency restoration 
settings, including jail-based programs.103 In 2017, the Texas legislature approved 
an appropriation for a pilot program for a third time. 104  In addition to the 
appropriation, but without performing a pilot, lawmakers passed S.B. No. 1326, 
allowing for the use of jail-based competency restoration programs as an alternative 
to outpatient competency restoration programs or inpatient hospital competency 
programs.105  
The Texas Health and Human Services Commission awarded $1.9 million 
of the 2017 appropriation to four Texas jail-based competency restoration 
programs. 106  The services the programs provided included multidisciplinary 
treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, coordination of general healthcare, 
competency restoration education, and interviewing . 107  During 2019, these 
programs served 346 patient-defendants and restored competency to over 30% of 
those patient-defendants.108 Of those whose competence was not restored, some were 
sent to state hospitals and others had their charges dropped and were released.109 
 
97 HOGG FOUND. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, Texas 83rd Legislative Session: Summary of Mental-Health 
Related Legislation 1, 10 (2013). 
98 Brandi Grissom, Proposal: Allow Private Firms to Provide Mental Health Services in Jails, TEX. 
TRIB. (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/04/09/proposal-allow-private-mental-health-
services-jail/ [https://perma.cc/2LY9-Q5DB]. 
99 Act of Sept. 1, 2013, ch. 797, § 2, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 1–2 (West) (codified as TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.090) 
100 AMANDA WIK, ALTERNATIVES TO INPATIENT COMPETENCY RESTORATION PROGRAMS: JAIL-BASED 
COMPETENCY RESTORATION PROGRAMS 1, 7 (2018). 
101 HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES COMM’N, REPORT ON THE JAIL-BASED COMPETENCY RESTORATION 
PILOT PROGRAM 1, 5 (2017). 
102 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL, MENTAL HEALTH COMMITTEE REPORTS & RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 7 (2016). 
103 Id. at 6.  
104 Act of Sept. 1, 2017, ch. 748, § 29, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 33–36 (West) (codified as amended 
at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.090). 
105 Act of Sept. 1, 2017, ch. 748, § 14, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1, 17–19 (West) (codified as amended 
at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.073). 
106 LAQUINTA SWAN & LUCRECE PIERRE-CARR, TEXAS COMPETENCY RESTORATION: OUTPATIENT AND 
JAIL-BASE 1, 13 (2019). 
107 Id. at 14. 
108 See id. at 15. 
109 Id. at 9. 
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Upon review, a representative of the pilot program at Lubbock considered the 
programs successful and was pleased with the program’s progress.110 
The Texas legislation allowing for jail-based competency restoration would 
be toothless were it not for another law passed in the 2007 legislative session: Article 
46B.0095.111  This statute includes a provision allowing an IST defendant to be 
committed to a mental hospital, inpatient competency restoration program, or jail-
based competency restoration program for a period of time up to the length of the 
maximum term for the offense of which the defendant is accused.112 If the court has 
found that a defendant’s competence is unlikely to be restored, this provision allows 
for a de facto finding of guilt—a maximum sentence for a crime for which the 
defendant has neither been tried nor found guilty. In essence, this is a sentence 
punishing the crime of incompetence.  
By imposing the sentencing term from the patient-defendant’s accused 
crime, the Texas legislature has circumvented the Court’s decision in Jackson v. 
Indiana that held that the indefinite commitment of an IST defendant is a violation 
of due process. 113  However, the Texas statute creates a constitutional issue by 
affording a de facto sentence to a defendant who has neither been tried nor found 
guilty.114 This violation of procedural due process is particularly offensive because 
it preys upon defendants who do not have the practical capacity to question the 
statute’s constitutionality.  
To date, only one case has addressed Texas’s practice of applying statutory 
sentences to civil commitments. In Reinke v. State, Mr. Reinke, a defendant declared 
by the court to be incompetent to stand trial, was committed to a mental health 
facility.115 On appeal, Mr. Reinke challenged the lower court’s use of punishment 
enhancements to increase his commitment from 20 years (the statutory maximum for 
attempted murder, the crime of which he was accused), to 99 years.116 The court held 
that the use of enhancements was improper, and that the authorizing statute’s 
language117  did not provide for the use of sentence enhancements.118  The court 
remanded the case to the district court for readjustment of Mr. Reinke’s commitment 
to 20 years.119  
 
110 TEX. JUD. COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, MEETING NOTEBOOK 1, 19 (2019). 
111 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.0095 (West 2017) (previously codified as TEX. CODE. CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 46B.009).  
112 Id. 
113 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (“[W]e . . . hold that Indiana’s indefinite commitment 
of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.”). 
114 See art. 46B.0095.  
115 Reinke v. State, 348 S.W.3d 373, 375 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
116 Id. 
117 TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.0095 (West 2020). 
118 Reinke, 348 S.W.3d at 381 (interpreting TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.0095 (West 2020)).  
119 Id. (failing to show any indication that Mr. Reinke’s attorney raised the issue that the commitment 
itself may be a violation of Mr. Reinke’s procedural due process rights: an issue of constitutionality that 
Texas courts have not yet been faced with respect to this statutory scheme). 
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At present, six states allow courts to involuntarily commit IST defendants 
for the maximum sentence for the crime of which they are accused.120 Other states 
employ varying standards, including commitment for the “two-thirds of the 
authorized maximum term of imprisonment for the highest class felony charged”121 
and “three years” except when charged with murder.122 
 
V. AN URGENT NEED FOR CHANGE 
 
The problem with Kentucky’s law regarding incompetence is highlighted 
in the case of Cane Madden. In August  2019, a Louisville, Kentucky court found 
Madden incompetent to stand trial for a charge of burglary from May 2019, and he 
was involuntarily committed to Central State Hospital.123 But because administrators 
at Central State deemed Madden to be unresponsive to treatment,124 he was released 
less than 24 hours later.125 In August 2019, an eight-year-old girl in Louisville was 
hit in the head with a shovel, fracturing her skull, and raped.126 Madden was seen in 
the area before and after the assault, and he was arrested by Louisville police during 
the early hours of the morning.127 Madden revealed to officers explicit details of the 
assault and rape.128  
When Madden appeared in court, his attorney requested that the charges 
against him be dropped, citing a past criminal matter against Madden were charges 
dropped due to incompetence.129 Judge O’Connell denied the motion and scheduled 
 
120 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-04-08 (West 2013); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-460 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-10A-15 (2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 46B.0095 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-6 (West 2018). 
121 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.50 (McKinney 2013). 
122 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 20.01 (West 2020) (not specifying the time frame for commitment for a 
defendant accused of murder). Courts have generally upheld these qualified statutory commitments, 
with the exception of a Massachusetts statute that was held in violation of due process when it 
authorized commitment for the maximum time of imprisonment that person would serve before 
becoming eligible for parole for their most serious charge. Sharris v. Commonwealth, 106 N.E.3d 661 
(Mass. 2018). Because the Massachusetts statutory scheme denies parole eligibility to those serving a 
life sentence for first degree murder, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the application of this 
statutory commitment to an IST defendant accused of first-degree murder amounted to an indefinite 
commitment and a violation of substantive due process. Id. at 664; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, 
§ 16 (West 2015); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West 2014). 
123 Jason Riley & Chad Mills, ‘Every Prosecutor’s Nightmare’: Sex Assaults Highlight ‘Crazy 
Loophole’ Freeing Mentally Ill Defendants, WDRB.COM (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.wdrb.com/in-
depth/sunday-edition-sex-assaults-highlight-crazy-loophole-freeing-mentally-ill/article_a4a498f2-c5bb-
11e9-9284-ffe7e1349599.html [https://perma.cc/5KVF-GENR]. 
124 See id. 
125 Id. 
126 Billy Kobin, Louisville Man Fractured 8-Year-Old’s Skull With a Shovel and Raped Her, Police Say, 





129 Deni Kamper, Man Accused of Raping 8-Year-Old is Example of Crack in System, Lawmaker Says, 
WLKY.COM (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.wlky.com/article/man-accused-of-raping-8-year-
old-is-example-of-crack-in-system-lawmaker-says/29591750# [https://perma.cc/H8SZ-BHQ5]. 
 12 
a hearing, allowing the Kentucky legislature the opportunity to amend the statutory 
provisions governing IST defendants with no substantial likelihood of regaining 
competence.130  
Madden’s case has garnered national attention,131 and Kentucky legislators 
encountered outrage from the community, including a petition with over 11,000 
signatures demanding that Madden not be released.132 On February 20, 2020, Senator 
Morgan McGarvey, a Democrat from Kentucky’s 19th District, filed Senate Bill 
188.133 The bill, co-sponsored by Senator Julie Raque Adams (a Republican from 
Kentucky’s 36th District) and Senator Denise Harper Angel (a Democrat from 
Kentucky’s 35th district),134 would enable certain violent criminal IST defendants, 
with no substantial probability of attaining competency, to be placed on judicial 
commitment.135 Under this form of commitment, a judge appoints a guardian ad litem 
to the defendant who is then tasked with advising and representing the defendant at 
all legal proceedings.136  
Although Senate Bill 188 proposed solutions, it also introduced a myriad of 
constitutional, procedural, and logistical problems. The first problem encountered is 
with the appointment of a guardian ad litem to an IST defendant.137 The use of a 
guardian ad litem in representing a criminal defendant is unprecedented in the United 
States. To appoint a guardian ad litem to a criminal defendant is to acknowledge his 
incompetence, and such an acknowledgement mandates that the criminal 
proceedings be halted until competence is regained.138 Regardless of the advocacy a 
guardian ad litem might provide, the defendant still does not have the ability to 
understand the proceedings against him, and that is the crux of his substantive due 
 
130 See id. 
131 John Hirschauer, Kentucky’s Insane Civil-Commitment Policy, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 24, 2019, 9:01 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/10/kentuckys-insane-civil-commitment-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/P673-ZZ5R]; Josh Saunders, Man, 29, is Arrested for Raping an 8-Year-Old Girl After 
First Hitting Her Over the Head with a Shovel – Two Years After He Was Let Off On Another Sex 
Assault Charge, DAILYMAIL.COM (Aug. 12, 2019, 9:55 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
7346203/Man-29-arrested-hitting-eight-year-old-girl-head-shovel-raping-her.html 
[https://perma.cc/RM7F-8E4T]; Dom Calicchio, Man Raped 8-Year-Old Girl After Hitting Her in Head 
with Shovel, Fracturing Her Skull: Police, FOX NEWS (Aug. 10, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/us/man-hit-8-year-old-girl-in-head-with-shovel-fracturing-her-skull-then-
raped-her-police [https://perma.cc/GV23-6ARK]. 
132 Denita Wright, California Neighborhood Residents Request the Non-Release of Cane Madden, 
CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/senator-morgan-mcgarvey-california-neighborhood-residents-
request-the-non-release-of-cane-madden [https://perma.cc/B67C-5WTS]. 
133 S. B. 188, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2020).  
134 Senate Members by Name, KY. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/Legislators/smembers_alpha.html [https://perma.cc/8WS2-ZWK3]. 
Somewhat inexplicably, Senator Harper Angel is the only one of the bill’s sponsors whose district 
includes the location of Madden’s last alleged attack. 
135 Ky. S.B. 188.  
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (“[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is 
legally incompetent violates due process . . . .”). 
 13 
process rights.139 The ability of a defendant to participate in his defense is crucial.140 
The appointment of a guardian ad litem simply does not comport with the spirit or 
letter of the law requiring a court to halt proceedings against an incompetent 
defendant. 
Further, Senate Bill 188 called for the application of a “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard of proof in the competency hearing the bill prescribes.141 Under 
current Kentucky law, the standard of proof at a competency hearing is the same as 
that for all evidentiary hearings.142 This standard is in compliance with Supreme 
Court precedent, which clearly prohibits a state from requiring a defendant’s 
incompetence to be proven by a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, because 
it would allow a state to try a defendant who is more likely incompetent than 
competent, a clear violation of due process.143 For this reason, if enacted, S.B. 188 
would be susceptible to constitutional challenges on the standard of proof it seeks to 
impose. 
Lastly, Senate Bill 188 implicitly authorized indefinite commitment of IST 
defendants.144  After a defendant has been committed, he must undergo periodic 
review hearings to reassess competency.145 During the first year of commitment, the 
defendant’s competence shall be reviewed every three months; during the second 
year of commitment, the defendant’s competence shall be reviewed every six months; 
and during subsequent years, the defendant’s competence shall be reviewed 
annually.146 In fewer words, the proposed bill authorized the commitment of an IST 
defendant until the end of his life or until he regains competence, whichever happens 
sooner.147 This indefinite commitment is in clear defiance of the Court’s holding that 
such commitments resulting from incompetence to stand trial are in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.148  
Before Senate Bill 188 could be approved by the Senate Health, Welfare, 
and Family Services Committee, COVID-19 eclipsed the state’s legislative 





139 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (holding that test of competency is whether a 
defendant has reasonable ability to consult with his lawyer and reasonably comprehends the legal 
proceedings against him). 
140 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he 
lacks the capacity to . . . assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial.”). 
141 Ky. S.B. 188. 
142 Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007). 
143 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369–70 (1996). 




148 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732 (1972). 
149 Jack Brammer & Daniel Desrochers, Beshear Gives Lawmakers 2 Options Amid Controversy Over 
Legislature Continuing to Meet, HERALD LEADER (Mar. 17, 2020, 8:25 PM), 
https://www.kentucky.com/news/coronavirus/article241261676.html. 
150 See Mills & Riley, supra note 123. 
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VI. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE IN KENTUCKY 
 
 Community members, prosecutors, victims’ advocates, judges, and public 
defenders have all voiced opinions on how Kentucky’s laws might be amended in 
order to prevent situations like Madden’s from occurring. The suggestions carry 
varying levels of applicability, relevance, and constitutionality and are individually 
considered here. 
 Wendy Morris, Commissioner of the Kentucky Department for Behavioral 
Health, recently suggested that creation of more mental health courts could prevent 
exploitation of this loophole in Kentucky’s competency laws. 151  However, the 
jurisdiction of Kentucky’s mental health courts will require significant expansion. 
At present, none of Kentucky’s mental health courts accept defendants charged with 
violent felonies or sexual offenses.152 Further, most mental health courts across the 
country do not provide services to IST defendants because involvement in such 
courts is supposed to be voluntary and participatory. 153  For these reasons, the 
institution of more mental health courts in Kentucky is unlikely to create a 
meaningful impact on the loophole at hand. 
 Another proposed solution is to add a provision to Kentucky’s statutes that 
allows for the involuntary commitment of an incompetent criminal defendant for a 
length of time up to the maximum statutory sentence for the crime of which he is 
accused.154  This strategy is employed by a few other states and has weathered 
challenges thus far.155 However, the implementation of such legislation is likely to 
be unpopular among mental health advocates who find this form of sentencing 
without trial or verdict to be an alarming threat to the constitutional rights afforded 
to criminal defendants. 
 Instead of committing IST defendants under KRS 202A.026 or KRS 
202B.040, the legislature could create a third provision exclusively for criminal 
commitment. To pass such a law would, in effect, be to revive the age of the asylum, 
as these indefinitely committed criminals would require housing in forensic 
psychiatry facilities. If such a provision were to contain similar criteria to that of 
KRS 202A.026 and KRS 202B.040, the statute could experience challenges on the 
grounds of imposing unnecessary restraint on defendants and on the grounds of the 
Jackson v. Indiana ruling prohibiting indefinite commitment.156 
 
151 Id. 
152 See Adult Mental Health Treatment Court Locator, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/gains-center/mental-health-treatment-court-
locator/adults?field_gains_mhc_state_value=KY [https://perma.cc/TKD7-EXVA]. 
153 MICHAEL THOMPSON, FRED OSHER & DENISE TOMASINI-JOSHI, IMPROVING RESPONSES TO PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A MENTAL HEALTH COURT 1, 5 (2007); 
SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS FOR OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS: EVALUATION OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN BRONX AND BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 1, 45 
(2012). 
154 See TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.0095 (West 2019). 
155 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-04-08 (West 2013); 
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 44-23-460 (2011); TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.0095 (West 2017); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-6 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.025 (West 2018). 
156 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
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If the criminal commitment statute created varied from those criteria set out 
in KRS 202A.026 and KRS 202B.040, however, the statute could be challenged for 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Equal Protection Clause violations like the 
one the court found in Jackson v. Indiana could be avoided by placing the same 
standards for commitment and release on criminal defendants that KRS 202A.026 
and KRS 202B.040 place on those undergoing civil commitment and release 
proceedings.157 
Kentucky is one of only three states which require in statute that a patient 
be likely to benefit from treatment in order to remain involuntarily committed in an 
inpatient facility.158 If Kentucky were to change this requirement from mandatory 
criteria to permissive criteria, the problem of mental health administrators releasing 
dangerous, IST defendants with no substantial likelihood of restoration would likely 
be avoided. The statutory language “benefit from treatment” harkens back to the 
earliest days of involuntary commitment when such benefit comprised the sole 
criterion for commitment. 159  However, as Kentucky’s statutory scheme for 
commitments have undergone numerous revisions,160 and include other criteria in 
step with the commitment statutes of most other states,161 there is no longer a need 
for such an ambiguous nicety. The statutory provisions already in place, regarding 
the least restrictive care setting possible, and regarding a defendant’s threat of danger 
to self or others provide sufficient safeguards for the humane treatment of 
involuntarily committed psychiatric patients. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING COMMITMENT STANDARDS 
 
The eyes of Kentuckians are upon the legislature as it attempts to both close 
this loophole in Kentucky’s law and determine the disposition of Cane Madden’s 
pending criminal charges. The implications of Kentucky’s action regarding 
incompetency will extend far beyond the case at hand, despite the limited impact the 
state’s legislature anticipates. Fiscal impacts aside, the legislation Kentucky enacts 
will reflect the esteem with which it regards public safety, accountability, and due 
process.  
Among the solutions offered here, the most feasible, wholistic option is the 
removal of “who can reasonably benefit from treatment” from the commitment 
criteria under KRS 202A and 202B. Under such circumstances, a defendant like 
Cane Madden could be civilly committed on the criteria that he is a danger to himself 
or others, and that such commitment is the least restrictive form of treatment 
available. Such commitment would end, then, not when the defendant achieved 
competence, but when he no longer posed a danger to himself or others. Although 
the United States Supreme Court has struck down statutes authorizing indefinite 
 
157 Id. at 727. 
158 TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., STATE STANDARDS CHARTS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT CIVIL 
COMMITMENT CRITERIA AND INITIATION PROCEDURE 1, 4–11 (2011). 
159 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., supra note 24. 
160 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.012 (West 2020) (repealed 1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.027 
(West 2020) (repealed 1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.060 (West 2020) (repealed 1976). 
161 TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., supra note 158. 
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commitment for the reason of incompetence alone,162 the Court has found that proof 
of dangerousness, in combination with incompetence, is sufficient grounds for the 
commitment of civil defendants.163  
No Kentucky case law gives significant meaning to the phrase “can 
reasonably benefit from treatment.” The phrase is a remnant of the intake procedure 
of 17th century insane asylums, and has regularly been embedded within Kentucky’s 
commitment statutes. There is little risk to removing this criterion, but there is great 
protection to be gained from it. Without it, administrators of forensic psychiatry 
facilities must justify the release of IST defendants on either the grounds that they 
are no longer dangerous, or there is a less restrictive mode of treatment available to 
the defendant.164  
This solution is most feasible because it does not require the creation of a 
new system of courts, it does not require the addition of a new classification of 
commitment, and it does not face inevitable constitutional challenge. It does, 
however, preserve the rights of IST criminal defendants and limit the court’s ability 
to commit them indefinitely for non-violent offenses. With the disposition of Cane 
Madden’s case hanging in the balance, it is essential that Kentucky lawmakers 
choose a course of statutory action that maximizes protection of the public and 
preservation of constitutional rights—and in this circumstance, the simplest solution 
just might be the best one. Deleting this element of commitment criteria could be the 
simplest, least-expensive, most popular criminal procedural reform in Kentucky’s 
history. 
 
162 See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972). 
163 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997). 
164 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (West 2021). 
